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Abstract 
Most primates live in highly complex social systems, and therefore have evolved 
similarly complex methods of communicating with each other.  One type of 
communication is the use of manual gestures, which are only found in primates.  No 
substantial evidence exists indicating that monkeys use communicative gestures in the 
wild.  However, monkeys may demonstrate the ability to learn and/or use gestures in 
certain experimental paradigms since they’ve been shown to use other visual cues such as 
gaze.  The purpose of this study was to investigate if ten brown capuchin monkeys 
(Cebus apella) were able to use gestural cues from monkeys and a pointing cue from a 
human to obtain a hidden reward.  They were then tested to determine if they could 
transfer this skill from monkeys to humans and from humans to monkeys.  One group of 
monkeys was trained and tested using a conspecific as the cue giver, and was then tested 
with a human cue-giver.  The second group of monkeys began training and testing with a 
human cue giver, and was then tested with a monkey cue giver.  I found that two 
monkeys were able to use gestural cues from conspecifics (e.g., reaching) to obtain a 
hidden reward and then transfer this ability to a pointing cue from a human.  Four 
monkeys learned to use the human pointing cue first, and then transferred this ability to 
use the gestural cues from conspecifics to obtain a hidden reward.  However, the number 
of trials it took for each monkey to transfer the ability varied considerably.  Some 
subjects spontaneously transferred in the minimum number of trials needed to reach my 
criteria for successfully obtaining hidden rewards (N = 40 trials), while others needed a 
	   vii	  
large number of trials to do so (e.g. N = 190 trials).  Two subjects did not perform 
successfully in any of the conditions in which they were tested.  One subject successfully 
used the human pointing cue and a human pointing plus vocalization cue, but did not 
learn the conspecific cue.  One subject learned to use the conspecific cue but not the 
human pointing cue.  This was the first study to test if brown capuchin monkeys could 
use gestural cues from conspecifics to solve an object choice task.  The study was also 
the first to test if capuchins could transfer this skill from monkeys to humans and from 
humans to monkeys.  Results showed that capuchin monkeys were able to flexibly use 
communicative gestures when they were both unintentionally given by a conspecific and 
intentionally given by a human to indicate a source of food.  
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Introduction	  
Communication in both wild and captive primate societies has been well 
documented.   Primates have many modes of communication in order to relay signals 
about food, sex, aggression, other primates, and other animals.  Most primates live in 
highly complex social systems, and therefore have evolved similarly complex methods of 
communicating with each other.  Diverse modes of communication among primate 
societies show how the act of communicating in groups is necessary in many different 
contexts.  Communication is necessary to maintain social relationships by mediating 
interactions, avoiding conflict, and affiliating with others, as well as for avoiding 
predators and communicating with other groups (Strier, 2011). 
The necessary components of communication include a signal, motivation, and 
meaning.  The signal is an act of communication, motivation refers to the sender’s 
internal state, and the meaning is an expression of what the recipient perceives the signal 
to be.  Altmann (1967) states that the definition of communication cannot be restricted to 
the signals, or to the response to the signals, but is a “process by which the behavior of an 
individual affects the behavior of others.”  Living in social groups is beneficial as it 
allows for an increase in foraging efficiency and anti-predator behavior (Strier, 2011).  
Therefore, a system of communication in groups can be adaptive.  However, in order for 
such groups to evolve some form of communication must occur.  The four main modes of 
primate communication are tactile, olfactory, vocal, and visual.   
Many primate societies exhibit high amounts of physical contact in their daily 
lives.  Groups often come into physical contact while grooming or playing.  For years, 
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infants cling to their mothers’ backs and aggression is often displayed as bites, scratches, 
and pushes.  Reconciliation after a fight can be exhibited in the form of touching and 
other affiliative behavioral responses.  Tactile communication is also necessary for 
copulation, and sometimes courting (Strier, 2011).   
Primates also have a wide range of auditory signals that are used for many 
different purposes.  Such signals are especially useful for primate species that live over 
large ranges or that live in dense habitats, such as rainforests (Altmann, 1967).  Vervet 
monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus), which live in the savannahs of Africa, exhibit a 
large repertoire of different signals depending on whom they are communicating with.  
They give different calls in intergroup and intragroup interactions, as well as in response 
to different types of predators (Zuberbuhler, Noe, & Seyfarth, 1997).  Within groups, 
primates often have a range of agonistic and affiliative encounters, many of which are 
accompanied by vocal signals.  Some calls are given when an individual is attacked, and 
therefore may function as a defensive threat or a solicitation to others for help (Altmann, 
1967).  Some females also exhibit anti-copulatory calls to ward off males when they are 
not in estrus.  Between groups, primates may use vocal communication to defend their 
territories or monopolize a food source (Altmann, 1967). 
Olfactory communication involves odorants that can be sensed in the presence of 
another animal, or deposited and left behind by an animal.  These scents could be 
pheromones that are deposited by glands that exist on different body surfaces, often on 
the anogenital region.  Such signals can convey the reproductive status, age, identity and 
sex of an individual (Strier, 2011).  Often, olfactory cues are used in combination with 
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other types of communication; therefore, cues are often not direct or immediate 
(Altmann, 1967).   
An advantage of visual communication is that it allows for the transfer of a signal 
between individuals without a tactile connection (Snowden, Brown, & Petersen, 1982).  
Terrestrial primates make great use of visual communication as they usually live in more 
open landscapes and can see each other.  Visual communication is often categorized into 
passive and active communication.  Passive communication refers to visual signals such 
as color, hue or size.  Adult male patas monkeys (Erythrocebus patas) have white fur 
around their posterior, which can act as a signaling function for its social group 
(Altmann, 1967).  Active communication, such as the use of facial expressions, is often 
also used in primate societies as a method of communication.  One example is lip 
smacking, which is a nonaggressive expression exhibited by both dominant and 
subordinate individuals (Altmann, 1967).   
Another type of active visual communication is the use of manual gestures, which 
are only found in primates (Roberts, Vick, & Buchanan-Smith, 2012).  They have been 
defined as a non-locomotory movements of a finger, wrist, hand, foot, leg, or arm that is 
directed towards another individual and has communicative value (Pollick & de Waal, 
2007).  The use of manual gestures has been documented in apes such as chimpanzees 
(Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), and gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) in both the wild 
and captivity (Pollick, & de Waal, 2007, Roberts et al., 2012, Genty, Breuer, Hobaiter, & 
Byrne, 2009, Hopkins & Leavens, 1998).  Apes use gestural signals in the contexts of 
playing, grooming, sexual activity, aggression, affiliation, and feeding (Pollick & de 
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Waal, 2007).  Many gestures can be used in one context but for a variety of different 
goals, and a single gesture may also serve more than one purpose or goal (Hobaiter & 
Byrne, 2011).  For example, a gesture that indicates a desire to copulate with a female 
may also function as a warning to other males to stay away (Hobaiter & Byrne, 2011).  
An ability to use gestural cues of different types could be adaptive in the highly 
communicative societies in which most primates live.  Although apes use communicative 
gestures in the wild, there is no substantial evidence that monkeys use intentional 
communicative gestures in the wild (Tomasello & Zuberbühler, 2002).  However, this 
does not necessarily mean that they do not have the ability to learn and/or use gestures in 
certain experimental paradigms.  
Some primate species have been shown to use unintended visual behavioral cues, 
such as facial expressions.  Research has shown that marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) are 
able to use the facial expressions of conspecifics shown on a screen as a social reference 
to determine whether or not a certain food is attractive (Kemp & Kaplan, 2013).  
Similarly, capuchin monkeys modified their duration and frequency of reaching towards 
a container after witnessing differential facial expressions directed towards the container 
(Morimoto & Fujita, 2011).  Different primate species have also been shown to use the 
gaze of a conspecific as a reliable cue.  Tomasello, Call, & Hare (1998) investigated the 
ability of five different primate species to follow the gaze cue of conspecifics.  The 
species tested were chimpanzees, sooty mangabeys (Cercocebus atys torquatus), rhesus 
macaques (Macaca mulatta), stumptail macaques (Macaca arctoides), and pigtail 
macaques (Macaca nemestrina).  Experimental trials consisted of the experimenter 
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holding up an orange so that one individual looked at it, and recording if another 
individual followed the gaze to the orange.  They found that all five primate species were 
able to follow a clear gaze cue from a conspecific in over 80% of the trials.  This study 
suggests that different primate species are able to pick up unintentional cues such as gaze.  
 A study by Mason and Hollis (1962) tested rhesus monkeys in an object choice 
task, in which they had to use cue information from a conspecific informant to find a 
hidden reward.  They found that subjects were successful in using information from the 
informant, but did not specify the cues they used.  Subjects were also tested with a 
monkey puppet and a plaque as a cue giver.  Both objects were placed in front of the cart 
containing the food item, and their location was meant to be the cue.  Most of the cues 
from the monkeys included the informants’ positioning near the reward, but the authors 
state that position alone was probably not a salient enough cue as subjects did not do as 
well when the monkey puppet, or plaque, was placed in front of the correct reward.  The 
study determined that while training the subjects to use the informant’s cue took over one 
thousand trials, they were able to transfer their use of the cue when presented with a new 
conspecific informant.  Since primates have been shown to use gaze cues and positioning 
cues to solve object choice tasks, they may be able to use additional cues from others to 
solve certain tasks as well. 
We know animals are capable of reading cues because many animals have been 
shown to be able to interpret gestural cues given by humans.  Smet and Byrne (2013) 
tested African elephants (Loxodonta africana) on their ability to use a human-given point 
to find hidden food in an object choice task.  The experimenter would point to one of two 
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containers containing the food, and the elephant would be allowed to select its choice.  
The study used conditions including the experimenter standing centrally, or closer to the 
wrong or correct container.  The arm used was also varied between the ipsilateral and 
contralateral in relation to the correct location of the food.  The study found that the 
elephants were able to use the point cues to obtain food significantly above chance in all 
conditions.  They did even better when the experimenter was also standing near the 
correct container, showing that the elephants were also using body location in their 
decisions.  Another study tested identically raised domesticated dogs (Canis familiaris) 
and wolves (Canis lupus) on a similar task (Virányi, Gácsi, Kubinyi, Topál, Belényi, 
Ujfalussy, Miklósi, 2008).  They found that dogs and wolves were able to successfully 
use a human pointing cue to find hidden food, though the wolves’ performances were 
relatively poor and varied highly.  The authors suggest that differences between dogs and 
wolves may arise as a result of traits selected for during domestication.  Clark’s 
nutcrackers (Nucifraga Columbiana) were also tested on an object choice task to obtain 
hidden food (Tornick, Gibson, Kispert, & Wilkinson, 2011).  They were given human 
cues such as touching the correct container, pointing to it, or gazing at it.  Five out of six 
of the subjects tested were able to use each cue to find the hidden food.   
As many species read human cues, it is not surprising that apes and monkeys also 
have the ability to use human given cues to solve object choice tasks.  In captivity, both 
monkey and ape species have been able to learn to use cues to solve such a task.  In an 
object-choice task, one of two opaque containers is baited with food out of sight of the 
subject animal.  The subject is then allowed to see the two containers and the 
	   7	  
experimenter or conspecific indicates the correct choice.  The subject then gets the 
opportunity to choose between the two containers, and receives the reward if it chooses 
correctly.  These cues are usually limited to a gaze cue plus a movement such as pointing, 
sometimes combined with a vocalization.  A study by Itakura & Tanaka (1998) 
discovered that chimpanzees were able to successfully use a human gaze and head 
orientation cue from a distance of 15cm and 60cm in an object choice task.  The 
chimpanzees were also able to use a glance from just the eyes of the experimenter, but 
they took more trials to do so successfully.  An orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus), was also 
tested, and was 100% successful using the same cues as the chimpanzees except 
glancing, for which she made a single error.  This orangutan, however, was a show 
orangutan working with her trainer as the experimenter.  Therefore, it is possible the 
orangutan had learned to use gazing and/or glancing cues in previous unrelated training.  
Another study by Peignot and Anderson (1999) demonstrated that gorillas were able to 
use gaze cues from human experimenters.  When presented with an object choice task 
and cues from a human experimenter, they were successful in almost every condition.  
These conditions included a “close” and “far” gaze and head orientation cue.  However, 
in the condition of only eyes gazing, without the head orientation, at the correct 
container, the gorillas’ performances were unsuccessful.  Thus, the great apes are able to 
use head orientation and gaze cues together to solve object-choice tasks, but perform with 
less success when given only an eye-gaze cue.  Anderson, Sallaberry, and Barbier (1995) 
tested capuchin monkeys in a similar task that used both human gaze and pointing cues 
towards a hidden reward.  In this experiment a gazing cue, as well as other cues, were 
	   8	  
used to indicate where food was located in an object-choice paradigm.  The only 
experiments in which the capuchins tested above chance were those that involved 
pointing cues.  This suggests that cues other than gaze, such as pointing, are also 
necessary for capuchin monkeys to make use of the cue.   
Povinelli, Parks, & Novak (1992) trained rhesus monkeys as informants or cue-
givers as part of a study that investigated their ability to transfer knowledge of a task 
across roles played in a trial.  In order to train monkeys as informants, they sat opposite a 
human experimenter and were rewarded when they made any manual gestures towards 
the location of food that was hidden from the human.  All monkeys were able to learn to 
provide a reaching gesture in order to receive a reward.  Baboons have also been taught 
to use a manual ‘pointing’ gesture through operant conditioning (Meunier, Prieur, & 
Vauclair, 2013).  Povinelli, Nelson, & Boysen (1992) also conducted this study with 
chimpanzees and were able to train subjects to use a manual gesture to indicate the 
location of a hidden reward.  These results show that it is possible for apes and monkeys 
to provide reliable cues to indicate the location of hidden food.  Another study on 
chimpanzees tested to see if they were able to understand pointing cues given by both a 
human and a conspecific (another chimpanzee) towards a hidden piece of food (Itakura, 
Agnetta, Hare, & Tomasello, 1999).  Chimpanzees were given an object choice task, and 
expected to use cue information to make their decision.  The first cue given was a local 
enhancement cue, in which either a human or another chimpanzee stood next to the 
correct bucket of food.  The second cue was a gaze and point cue, also given by a human, 
and then another chimpanzee.  The study found that the chimpanzees performed better 
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when the human or chimpanzee stood next to the hidden food rather than only pointing at 
the food.  In the second part of the study, they added a vocal cue.  The experimenter gave 
a gaze cue with a simulated ‘chimpanzee bark’ or a nonsense word.  The chimpanzees did 
significantly better with vocalizations, but results between the two vocalizations were 
similar.  This suggests that other cues may be necessary for chimpanzees to detect the 
presence of a reward using gestural cues.  In the wild, many chimpanzees may detect the 
location of food based on the proximity of another ape to the food.  Therefore, they may 
need a more robust cue than a point to detect the presence of food.  Another study found 
that a gaze cue alone was not sufficient, and that a vocalization, or a gestural movement 
was also necessary for chimpanzees to read the cues from humans (Call, Agnetta, & 
Tomasello, 2000).  The sounds included in this study were a simulated chimpanzee bark 
made by the experimenter, snapping the fingers, and slapping the table.  However, 
gestural movements were not made in the direction of the hidden food.  Rather, only a 
gaze cue was given, and the sounds were used in order to draw the attention of the subject 
to the cue giver.   
The purpose of this study was to investigate if brown capuchin monkeys were 
able to use gestural cues from monkeys and a pointing cue from a human to obtain a 
hidden reward, and then transfer the skill between species.  Because capuchin monkeys 
have exhibited the ability to learn to use pointing cues from a human experimenter 
(Anderson, Sallaberry, and Barbier 1995), we hypothesized that they could learn to use 
gestural cues from conspecifics in the same type of object choice task.  To date, there are 
no studies that test capuchin monkeys’ (Cebus apella) abilities to use a conspecific’s 
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gestural cues in an object-choice task.  Subjects at Bucknell University’s Animal 
Behavior Lab were tested on this task and a human pointing task.  I tested two groups of 
monkeys in an object-choice paradigm using cues from either a human experimenter or a 
conspecific.  The first group of monkeys was trained and tested using a conspecific as the 
cue giver.  Once these trials were completed, the subject monkeys were then tested with a 
human experimenter.  The second group of monkeys began training and testing with a 
human cue giver, and later moved on to a monkey cue giver.  If the monkeys were able to 
learn the skill with conspecifics, I was able to test if they were able to transfer this skill to 
the human experimenter, and vice versa.  In both cases, the subject monkey should take 
fewer trials to achieve over chance performance with the second species giving them cues 
if they were flexibly using the gestures as a form of communication.  To date, there are 
no studies that test the transfer of using a cue from one species to another.  While Itakura 
et al. (1999) tested chimpanzees on an object-choice task using cues from both 
conspecifics and humans, they did not analyze the possibility that the chimpanzees 
learned to use the skill from the conspecifics and then used this knowledge to understand 
a cue from the human.  They were also not able to test some chimpanzees first with 
human cue givers, and therefore could not make the same comparisons made in this 
study.  
In this study subjects sat in an apparatus that allowed them to see another monkey 
or a human cue giver, but kept them physically separate.  A pair of inverted opaque cups 
was placed in between the subject and the conspecific or human.  One cup was baited out 
of sight of the subject.  Depending on the condition, the subject then watched the 
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conspecific make a gestural cue towards the baited cup, or the experimenter point to the 
cup.  The cups were then moved within reach of the subject, who was allowed to turn one 
of the cups to see if a reward was inside.  If the subject used gestural cues, it should select 
the cup that the gesture indicated, and therefore would receive a reward.  
I predict that successful performance demonstrates flexible communicative 
cognitive abilities in capuchin monkeys.  Capuchin monkeys were not only able to read 
cues given by others even though they do not naturally use gestural communication, but 
that they can do so from two different species.  Secondly, they were able to transfer this 
knowledge between species, and test at above-chance levels more quickly when moved to 
the second species.  Thirdly, if monkeys failed to use cues given by one species, they 
were tested on their ability to use cues from the other species.  There have been no other 
studies conducted of this kind.  This study contributes the first data on whether capuchin 
monkeys can use gestural cues from one species, and transfer the cue use to the other 
species.  Results show that capuchin monkeys are able to flexibly use communicative 
gestures when they are both unintentionally given by a conspecific and intentionally 
given by a human to indicate a source of food. 
 
 
Methods 
 
Subjects and Housing 
Ten brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), two adult males, five adult females, 
and three juveniles, participated in the experiment.  Subjects were socially housed in a 
group of 17 individuals that consisted of two adult males, nine adult females, four 
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juveniles, and two infants.  The colony was established in 2000, and the dominance 
hierarchy of its members has remained stable since.  No other animals have been 
introduced or removed from the colony other than by birth or death.  All monkeys that 
would reliably enter the apparatus, were not infants, or whose infants did not physically 
interfere with the testing situation, were chosen to participate.  Cueing monkeys were two 
adult males and six adult females.  Subjects and cueing monkeys were paired together if 
there were no excessive threats or distractions made by one of the two monkeys when 
they faced each other in the apparatus.  Such threats or distractions were considered 
excessive if one of the monkeys would not reliably stay in the apparatus.  Subjects 
randomly assigned to the conspecific-first group were Monet (Mt), Socrates (Sc), 
Schroeder (Sd), Niko (Nk), and Newton (Nw).  The remaining subjects in the human-first 
group were Nye (Ny), Davinci (Dv), Sheba (Sb), Smithson (Sm), and Stella (St).  Cueing 
monkeys were Nobel (Nb), Deangela (De), Davinci (Dv), Monet (Mt), Newton, (Nw), 
Niko (Nk), Socrates (Sc), and Schroeder (Sd).  Cueing monkeys were assigned to 
subjects randomly, and only switched if the cueing monkey would not give reliable cues 
or the subject monkey would not reliably stay in the apparatus when the cueing monkey 
was present.  None of the subjects had experience with object-choice tasks, although 
some subjects were familiar with the testing environment from previous studies.  
Subjects were housed in the Animal Behavior Laboratory at Bucknell University, 
Lewisburg PA.  Housing consisted of caging that spanned three separate rooms, with 
compartments interconnected by doorways and overhead tunnels (Figure 1).  The 
doorways could be closed, and the tunnels blocked with metal barriers, in order to 
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separate animals into separate compartments.  There were 17 possible subcompartments 
that could be closed off, three of which were used for testing.  Compartments were 
furnished with perches, platforms, and swinging toys to allow for naturalistic movement.  
Floors were made of linoleum and covered with wood shavings.  Subjects were fed twice 
a day on a diet of monkey chow, cereals, nuts, grains, fruits, and vegetables.  Water was 
available ad libitum.  Daily enrichment was provided for all monkeys in the form of toys 
and climbing structures.  Participation in research was also considered enrichment for this 
group.  All procedures were approved by Bucknell’s Institutional Animal Care and Use 
Committee according to requirements within the Guide for the Care and Use of 
Laboratory Animals.  
Apparatus 
Three rooms, two large rooms connected by a central smaller room, in the 
capuchin enclosure were used for testing (Figure 1).  The larger side rooms measured 1.6 
by 2.2 by 2.4 m and the smaller middle room measured 0.9 by 1.0 by 0.5 m.  There were 
openings measuring 0.6 by 0.6 m, 0.9 m from the ground, in the walls connecting the 
three rooms.  The apparatus consisted of a rectangular steel frame measuring 0.6 by 1.1 
by 0.5 m.  The apparatus was placed in the openings interconnecting the three rooms and 
spanned the length of the middle room (Figure 2).  Wire caging segmented the apparatus 
frame into three sections.  The two side sections allowed for monkeys to enter and sit in 
the apparatus through the openings in the wall.  The center compartment of the apparatus 
held a 43.2 cm bar that slid back and forth between the two side sections.  On each end of 
the bar was an inverted white cup with one side cut out that was able to swivel 360˚.  The 
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holes in the caging wire (2.5 x 5 cm) entering into the center section of the apparatus 
were large enough for the monkeys to reach the length of their arm into the center 
compartment to access the cup, and for a human experimenter to extend an entire index 
finger through the caging. 
 
Procedures 
Training.  Training consisted of four phases that were meant to accustom the 
subjects to the apparatus and the nature of the experiment.  Half of the subjects went 
through training with a conspecific, while half went through training with a human 
experimenter (E).  The following depicts the training phases in which the cue giver was a 
monkey or a human, depending on the testing group in which the subject belonged.  
Either a single experimenter, or two experimenters stood next to the apparatus in order to 
move the cups from the cue giver to the subject.  
Phase 1.  Phase 1 trained the subjects to properly turn the cups on the bar in the 
center portion of the apparatus order to retrieve a reward (Figure 3a).  The subject 
watched E bait one cup, and was then given the option to take the reward from the cup.  
The angles of the cups increased from 0˚ to 90˚, 120˚, and 180˚ away from the subject.  
Subjects were required to consistently turn the baited cup to retrieve the reward even 
though it eventually could not see the reward at a 180˚ angle.  The subjects were given 
five trials at each angle for a total of 20 trials.  
Phase 2.  Phase 2 trained the subject monkey that the cue giver was able to 
retrieve a reward from the cups (Figure 3b).  The cups were oriented so that the open side 
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faced the subject monkey.  Both the subject and cue giver watched the baiting process, 
and the cups were then moved towards the cue giver.  The cue giver turned the cups to 
retrieve the reward.  Subjects were given two blocks of 10 trials in this phase.  
Phase 3.  Phase 3 trained the subject that the cue giver could see and retrieve the 
reward, even when the subject could not see the reward in the cup (Figure 3c).  
Therefore, the cue giver should be considered an informed partner.  The cups were 
oriented so that the open side faced the cue giver. Both the subject and cue giver watched 
the baiting process.  The cups were then moved towards the cue giver, who retrieved the 
reward.  Thus, even though the subject could not see the reward in the cup, it could see 
that the cue giver was able to see it and retrieve it.  Subjects were given two blocks of 10 
trials at this phase.  
Phase 4.  Phase 4 trained the subject that the cue giver was able to see and 
retrieve the reward when the subject did not witness the baiting process, and was 
therefore still an informed partner (Figure 3d).  The cups were oriented so that the open 
side faced the cue giver and the baiting process was hidden from the subject by a 0.7 by 
0.4 m wooden board.  When the board was removed, the cups were moved toward the 
cue giver who retrieved the reward.  Though the subject could not know that there was a 
reward in one of the cups, it saw that the cue giver was still able to see the reward and 
take it.  Subjects were given four blocks of 10 trials at this phase.  
In total, 100 trials were given across all training phases for each subject.  In phase 
1 the rewards alternated between the two cups between each trial.  In phases 2-4 the 
	   16	  
rewards alternated in a pseudorandom order in which the reward was in each cup five 
times in one block of 10 trials, and never in the same cup more than twice consecutively. 
After the cue giver received the reward in each training trial, a reward would be 
placed in the same cup for the subject monkey in order to maintain its interest in 
participating.  When two experimenters were present with the apparatus, baiting was 
alternated between the two to avoid bias for one experimenter.  When only one 
experimenter was present with the apparatus, the experimenter spent the first five trials 
on one side of the apparatus, and the next five trials on the other side of the apparatus.  
The side on which the single experimenter started was alternated at every block of trials.  
This was done so the position of the experimenter did not introduce any bias into the 
experiment.  
Testing Conditions.  There were three conditions used in this study, conspecific, 
pointing, and control. 
Conspecific.  In this condition, the subject would sit opposite another monkey and 
use any cues given by a cue giver monkey to choose a cup.  Cues included extending the 
arm through the cage wiring from a finger to the entire arm, as well as sitting in front of 
the baited cup and gazing into it.  All cues occurred, but cues using any sort of limb 
extension through the wire caging were considered the most obvious.  
Pointing.  In this condition, the subject would sit opposite a human experimenter 
(E).  E would slowly lift the arm on the same side of the baited cup, and then extend the 
arm and index finger completely forward through the caging at the level of the cup and 
on the same side.  E would alternate her eyes between the subject and the reward. 
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Control.  In this condition, there would be no cue giver.  One cup was baited out 
of view of the subject.  The cups were then moved towards the subject without a cueing 
monkey or pointing human across from it.  Control trials were used to create a baseline of 
success for each subject without using cues.  They were also used to ensure that subjects 
were not using inadvertent cues from the experimenters that were standing next to the 
apparatus and moving the cups to determine the correct cup and obtain rewards.   
Test Trials.  Trials began with boards blocking the view of both the cue giver and 
the subject (Figure 4).  In order to maintain the cueing monkey’s interest in participating, 
a trial began by first rewarding the cueing monkey.  One cup was baited, the board on the 
cueing side was then removed, and the cups were moved to the cue giver.  If the cue giver 
was a monkey, it received the reward and the cups were re-baited for the testing trial.  If 
the cue giver was E, the reward would remain in the cup.  If a human was cueing, this 
trial was done so the time in between trials was consistent, and so the trials were the same 
as trials with a conspecific cue giver.  This ‘cueing monkey reward’ portion of a trial was 
also done before each control trial to maintain consistency in timing.  A test trial for the 
subject was then given immediately after.  One cup was baited, and both boards were 
removed.  The cups were slid towards the cue giver, who would give a cue that differed 
depending on whether the cue giver was a monkey or a human.  After the cue was given, 
the cups were quickly moved to the subject monkey.  The subject monkey would make a 
choice by rotating one of the cups.  If it chose the cup that contained the reward it was 
allowed to retrieve the reward.  If it chose the wrong cup, the reward was moved out of 
reach and the correct cup was turned to show the subject the location of the reward.  
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Testing was conducted five days a week from January 2012 until March 2014.  Each 
subject was given a maximum of 10 trials per day.  Sessions lasted about 5-7 minutes per 
monkey.  
In order to accurately compare the use of conspecific cues and human cues in the 
test condition, half of the subjects were trained starting with a conspecific, and half were 
trained starting with a human experimenter.  For the conspecific conditions, monkeys 
were tested with at least two different conspecifics as cueing monkeys to test for transfer 
across conspecifics.  The human experimenter remained constant for each subject 
monkey.  
A binomial test was used for each subject to test for deviation from the expected 
outcome of performing at chance levels.  The criteria was 17/20 correct, which had a 
probability of p<.05 according to a binomial distribution.  Therefore our criteria for 
success in any of the conditions was to obtain 17 out of 20 trials correct in two 
consecutive ten trial sessions, and then to repeat that 17 out of 20 trial success in the next 
two ten trial sessions.  This was to ensure our criteria was very conservative.  
The general testing procedure for the conspecific-first group was to test the 
subject in the conspecific condition first, and then in the pointing condition.  In the 
human-first group, subjects were tested in the pointing condition first, and then the 
conspecific condition.  If subjects failed the first condition, they were still tested in the 
second condition.  A subject was considered to have failed if it exhibited a side bias, in 
which it picked the same cup on every trial, for at least 100 trials.  If the subject chose at 
random for 100 trials and therefore did not succeed at getting more than 50% of the trials 
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correct on average, it was also considered to have failed.  This ensured that all subjects 
were tested with both a conspecific and a human experimenter.  If subjects failed their 
first condition, but later became successful in the second condition, they were retested in 
the condition in which they had previously failed.  For example, if a subject failed in the 
conspecific condition but was successful in the pointing condition, it would be retested in 
the conspecific condition.  
 
 
Results 
 
All of the subjects in each condition went through every training phase. In the 
conspecific-first group, two of five subjects reached the criterion for success in both 
conspecific and human trials.  The minimum number of trials required to be considered 
successful in any condition was 40, since my criteria required subjects to get 17/20 trials 
correct twice consecutively.  Each subject’s success across all conditions is shown in 
Table 1.  Sc was tested with four conspecifics and reached criterion within 140 trials with 
her first cue giver, within 40 trials with her second cue giver, and within 100 trials with 
her fourth cue giver.  This showed her ability transfer the use of the cue across 
conspecifics.  She was not successful with her third cue giver, an adult male, probably 
because he only provided a gaze and not more obvious cues such as reaching.  When 
tested with the second male who provided reaching cues she was successful.  She was 
then tested in the human pointing condition and reached criterion within 60 trials.  This 
was evidence of her ability to transfer the use of the cue from conspecifics to humans 
because it took many more trials (N=140) to learn to use the cue from the first 
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conspecific (Figure 5).  Nw was tested with three conspecifics and reached criterion in 
190 trials with her first cue giver, 100 trials with her second cue giver, and 140 trials with 
her third cue giver. Results showed no transfer of the skill across conspecifics.  She was 
then tested in the human pointing condition and reached criterion after 190 trials.  Results 
showed no transfer of the skill from conspecifics to humans (Figure 6).  
 Three of five subjects were not initially successful in either the conspecific 
condition or in the human pointing condition.  Call et al. (2000) showed that the use of 
vocalizations in an object-choice task helped increase the performance of some 
chimpanzees.  A vocalization cue can be helpful because it can draw the attention of the 
subject to the cue giver, and because many primates use vocalizations in the context of 
finding and eating food (Call et al., 2000. Itakura et al., 1999).  I therefore added a third 
condition, which was identical to the human pointing condition but with an added 
vocalization, called the vocal point condition.  The trial was the same, except the 
experimenter would say “this one” when pointing to the baited cup.   
Sd was first tested with two conspecifics and then in the pointing condition but 
did not reach criterion.  She was then tested in the vocal point condition and reached 
criterion in 200 trials.  She then reached criterion in 40 trials when retested in the 
pointing only condition and in 40 trials when retested in the conspecific condition (Figure 
7).  Results indicated that Sd was able to transfer the use of the skill from the vocal point 
trials to the pointing trials, and from human pointing trials to conspecific trials.  Nk was 
first tested with two conspecifics and then in the pointing condition but did not reach 
criterion.  She was then tested in the vocal condition and reached criterion in 170 trials.  
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She then reached criterion in 40 trials when retested in the pointing only condition, 
indicating transfer of the use of the point.  She reached criterion in 150 trials when 
retested in the conspecific condition, which indicated that she did not transfer using a cue 
from a human to a conspecific (Figure 8).  Mt was tested with two conspecifics, in the 
pointing condition and in the vocal point condition, but did not reach criterion in any 
condition (Figure 9). 
In the human-first group, two of five of the subjects reached criterion in both the 
human pointing and conspecific condition.  St was successful in the first pointing 
condition within 130 trials.  She was then tested in the conspecific condition and reached 
criterion in 40 trials with her first cue giver and in 40 trials with her second cue giver 
(Figure 10).  Results showed that she was able to spontaneously transfer the ability to use 
the cue from a human to a conspecific, and across conspecifics.  Ny began testing in the 
pointing condition and reached criterion within 140 trials.  He was then tested in the 
conspecific condition and reached criterion within 110 trials with the first cue giver and 
within 40 trials with the second cue giver (Figure 11).  Results indicated that Ny was not 
able to transfer the use of the cue from a human to a conspecific cue-giver, but was able 
to do so across conspecifics.  Dv was unsuccessful in the pointing condition, and then 
unsuccessful in the conspecific condition with two different conspecifics, and so was 
advanced to the vocal point condition.  He was successful in the vocal point condition 
within 180 trials.  He was then retested in the pointing condition and was successful 
within 40 trials.  Results indicated that he was able to transfer the use of the skill from the 
vocal point condition to the pointing condition.  When retested in the conspecific 
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condition he was unsuccessful in 150 trials and was no longer tested (Figure 12).  Sm was 
unsuccessful in the first pointing condition.  He was then tested in the conspecific 
condition and was successful in 80 trials (Figure 13).  In future testing, Sm will be 
retested in the pointing condition to see if he is able to transfer the use of the skill from a 
monkey cue giver to a human cue giver.  Sb was unsuccessful in her first pointing 
condition (N = 220 trials), and vocal point condition (N = 100 trials; Figure 14).  In future 
testing, she will be tested in the conspecific cueing condition.  The order in which Sb was 
tested was different than the rest of her group, as she received the pointing condition, 
followed by the vocal point condition.  This was done to see if following the pointing 
condition immediately with the vocal point condition, instead of the conspecific 
condition, affected her performance.  
 
Discussion 
 
  
Results showed that capuchin monkeys could learn to use a conspecific gestural 
cue and a human point to solve an object choice task. Monkeys were also able to transfer 
their use of a cue between species, though there were many individual differences in their 
ability to do so.  Six animals were able to use a conspecific cue and a human point, 
transferring the skill between two species.  However, the order in which they completed 
the conditions and learned the skill varied across subjects.    
Three animals learned to use one type of cue, and then spontaneously used this 
knowledge when presented with another species of cue giver (human vs. monkey).  All of 
these animals took much longer to learn the skill initially, but transferred the skill when 
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presented with a novel cueing condition. Other animals had to relearn the skill entirely 
from the new type of cue giver.  For example, in the conspecific-first group Sc and Nw 
were the only two to learn to use the conspecific cue first.  However when switched to the 
human pointing condition, Sc quickly transferred the ability and used the human cue (60 
trials), but Nw took 190 trials to learn to use a human cue. The number of trials was the 
same as it took her to initially learn to use a conspecific as a cue giver (N = 190).  The 
number of trials it took to transfer the ability between conspecifics also varied for both 
subjects (Sc=40, 100; Nw= 100, 140).  Results indicated that Sc was faster at transferring 
the ability to read the cue or point between species, and to read the cue between two 
conspecifics than Nw. Sc learned to use the gestural cue of a conspecific and used this 
previous knowledge to understand and interpret a human pointing at the baited cup.  Nw 
showed the opposite pattern, of needing to relearn the new type of cue.  A similar trend 
was shown in the human-first group, in which St and Ny first reached criterion in the 
pointing condition, and then reached criterion in the conspecific condition immediately 
after.  St was successful in learning to use the human point within 130 trials, and directly 
transferred this ability to the conspecific cueing condition, reaching criterion in the 
minimum 40 trials.  Ny was successful in learning to use the human point in 140 trials, 
but took another 110 trials to reach criterion in the conspecific cueing condition.  Results 
indicated that St was able to spontaneously transfer the ability to use a cue across 
conditions, while Ny more likely relearned to use a conspecific gestural cue when 
introduced to that condition.  Theoretically, the spontaneous transfer of the use of a 
human pointing cue to a conspecific gestural cue, or vice versa, could mean that capuchin 
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monkeys were able to learn to read another’s behavior to find food, and then use this 
information even when it came from another monkey or another species.  
Two of the monkeys initially learned to use a cue in the vocal point condition and 
then transferred it to a human point and conspecific cue.  Though Sd and Nk were in the 
monkey-first group, they did not learn to use any cue until the vocal point condition.  
They learned to use a human point first, and later transferred that to the conspecific-
cueing condition.  Both of these subjects were able to transfer their ability to use the 
vocal point cue to using only a pointing cue.  However, both of these subjects varied in 
their ability to transfer the use of a human-given cue to a conspecific-given cue.  While 
Sd did so immediately, reaching criterion in the minimum 40 trials, Nk took 150 trials to 
do so.  Nk probably relearned to use the conspecific cue in the same way that she learned 
to use the human-given point, while Sd transferred her previous knowledge of how to 
interpret the cue from a human, and used it with a conspecific.   
Mason and Hollis’s study (1962) found that rhesus monkeys were capable of 
using cues from conspecifics to find a hidden food reward. However, their subjects took 
hundreds of trials to learn to use the information from the conspecific. In this study, no 
monkey that learned to use a conspecific’s cue did so in more than 190 trials. The authors 
also stated that while the body position of the cue-giver was important, there were 
probably other social cues that the subject was using to find the hidden reward.  These 
results shed light on what types of cues capuchin monkeys could use to solve an object-
choice task.  While monkeys do not usually use gestures to communicate, they could 
learn to do so if the gesture was accompanied by other communicative information such 
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body position.  Interestingly, Itakura et al. (1999) found that while chimpanzees could use 
a local enhancement cue (conspecific standing next to the food), they could not use a 
pointing cue from a conspecific. A probable cause for the differences was the distance 
between the conspecific and the reward location when the cue was given. The pointing 
cue was given when the chimpanzee was equidistant between the two buckets used in the 
task, while the local enhancement cue consisted of the chimpanzee standing directly next 
to the correct bucket. In this study, the apparatus was too small for the cueing monkeys to 
give their gestural cue from an equidistant position. Therefore, the subject monkey could 
have been reading the body position of the cueing monkey as well as the gesture.  That 
being said, results showed that a gestural cue is necessary in order to solve this task, as Sc 
could not read any cues from Dv, who only gazed at the reward but did not reach for it.  
Results also showed that capuchin monkeys were capable of learning to use a 
human pointing cue in fewer trials than previously thought.  No monkey took more than 
200 trials to reach criterion in any of the conditions.  In a previous study (Anderson et al. 
1995) the criteria for success was to obtain results significantly over chance (i.e. over 
50% correct).  Monkeys were given 270 trials to reach this criterion. The three animals 
tested reached criterion within the 270 trials, but only two ever got more than 80% 
correct in a block of 30 trials, and they each only did so in one or two blocks. Therefore 
since my criterion was to obtain 85% within a 20-trial block, in two consecutive blocks, 
and monkeys reached this criterion in 200 trials or less, they were more successful than 
capuchins in the previous study.  Differences in performance between the two studies 
could have been a result of individual differences between the capuchin monkeys.   
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Results should be discussed within the context of perspective taking and Theory 
of Mind.  Two aspects of Theory of Mind entail the understanding others’ mental states, 
and that others’ behavior is intentional (Tomasello & Call, 1997).  The conspecific cue, 
given by another monkey, can be described as unintentional.  The monkey was reaching 
towards the baited cup to retrieve the reward for itself and therefore, it was not doing so 
with the intention of signaling the subject monkey that the reward was in a particular cup.  
Rather, the subject monkey must have known that the cueing monkey was not telling it 
where to find the reward, but was trying to get the reward for itself.  Therefore, it is 
possible that the subject monkey was taking the perspective of the cueing monkey and 
understanding its intention to grab the reward for itself.  From this information, it would 
know which cup held the reward.  However, there are a few reasons that this was 
probably not the case.  First, it was more likely that the subjects were learning the 
reaching of the arm near the cup as an associative cue.  They were simply choosing the 
cup that was nearest to the arm of the cueing monkey.  This is a less cognitively complex 
mode of learning to solve this task, and does not require the subject to take the 
perspective or to understand the mental state of the cueing monkey.  Secondly, if the 
subject monkey knew that there was always food in one of the cups, it might have 
recognized the physical actions of the cueing monkey towards the baited cup as one that 
was in some way similar to a ‘food grabbing’ action seen in their daily lives.  It is 
possible the that subject monkey associated this movement with the location of food, and 
in that way understood that the cueing monkey was trying to get food in one of the cups; 
it should therefore choose that same cup, without having to take the mental perspective of 
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the cueing monkey.  This explanation is consistent with the method capuchin monkeys 
use to find food.  In this setting, they may often need to search for food in small holes, or 
retrieve food they have dropped in the cracks of different swings, perches, and toys that 
furnish their home cages.  Monkeys can then learn that the methods others use to retrieve 
these pieces of food can signal the location of food.  Thus, subjects may be recognizing 
an attempt to get to a reward, and choose the cup that was in the same direction in which 
the attempt was made.  In this case they would be recognizing a behavioral cue and 
interpreting it for their own benefit, without needing to understand the mental state or 
intention of a conspecific. There is evidence that both apes and monkeys are capable of 
understanding that conspecifics are animate entities with their own goals and intentions. 
They can recognize individuals, predict the behaviors of others, formulate social 
strategies to manipulate the behavior of others, and learn from the behavior of others 
(Tomasello & Call, 1997). However, much of what is known about these cognitive 
abilities does not necessarily attribute Theory of Mind to nonhuman primates. There are 
many other explanations that could be given to some of these findings. For example, 
capuchin monkeys can understand that a conspecific had the goal of getting the food for 
itself, but not know what it was seeing, or have a mental representation of the visual 
perception of the other monkey.  
The second cue was the pointing cue, sometimes accompanied by a vocalization, 
and was given by a human experimenter.  The point differed from the conspecific cue in 
that it was intentional; the human experimenter was intentionally signaling to the subject 
the location of the food.  However, the results of this study do not allow one to determine 
	   28	  
if the subjects understood the mental state of the experimenter, or know what the 
experimenter saw.  In all likelihood, they were learning to solve the task using simpler 
methods of associative cue learning.  In their first trials, many subjects exhibited side-
biases, in which they would continue to pick the same cup on every trial.  This behavior 
could be explained by a lack of interest, a lack of understanding of what was required in 
the task, or the monkey not paying attention to the cue.  However, most animals that 
exhibited a side bias eventually used the cue and switched to the other side, increasing 
success at the task.  If the subject switched to the other cup and received a reward, they 
could have seen and associated the experimenter’s finger on that same side.  Therefore it 
was possible that witnessing the finger in proximity to the correct cup and then receiving 
a reward allowed the subjects to learn to always choose the cup that was in closest 
proximity to the experimenter’s finger.  However, that argument becomes weaker when 
one considers the time and repetition needed to train such a behavior in a capuchin 
monkey.  Since many subjects spontaneously switched the cup they chose when they 
were exhibiting a side bias, and then immediately after increased their success, they only 
needed a few trials on which to learn that association.  Therefore, the subject may not 
have learned to associate the finger with the closest cup, but instead learned (or was 
reminded) that there was the possibility of the reward being hidden in either of the cups 
as opposed to just one.  At this point, the subject may have paid more attention to the cue 
giver to attempt to gather any information as to the whereabouts of the reward.  The 
subject did not have to know what the experimenter saw, nor what they were thinking, to 
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understand that they were capable of giving them information about the location of the 
food.   
This was the first study to document that capuchin monkeys can learn to use 
behavioral cues from conspecifics to solve an object choice task in a non-competitive 
environment.  In addition, this study showed that they were also able to use their 
knowledge of how to interpret these cues in order to solve the same task when the cue 
giver was a human experimenter.  This ability showed that they were flexible in their 
understanding of communicative skills in two ways.  First, they interpreted cues of two 
different species for the same purpose.  Second, they interpreted cues that were both 
intentional and unintentional.  They may not have known whether a cue was intentional 
or not, but it may not matter depending on how they were learning to interpret the cues.  
If they were associating the closest arm or finger to the baited cup with a reward, the 
intentionality of the cue was irrelevant.  The importance of these results was that 
capuchin monkeys were flexible in their learning of associating cues to find food, which 
could be an evolutionarily beneficial trait that can help them with foraging in the wild. 
Interestingly, the two subjects that did not pass in any conditions were the alpha 
male (Mt) and alpha female (Sb) of the group.  Such high-ranked animals should be able 
to succeed at this task since they are highly social and therefore may be more attuned to 
the movements of conspecifics.  However, it is also possible that the alpha male and 
female were not as observant of lower-ranked animals during feeding times.  They both 
have priority in the group when being fed, and as a result are usually the first to take the 
food.  It is possible that they are not as motivated or as able as lower-ranked individuals 
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to learn strategies to gain food because higher-ranked individuals get rewards more often 
than others.   
 The individual differences exhibited by the subjects in this study provide evidence 
that individual capuchin monkeys interpret social cues in different ways.  While six of the 
ten subjects were able to complete the task in conditions with a human given cue and a 
conspecific given cue, they all did so in different patterns, and within a different number 
of trials.  Two of those subjects, Sd and Nk, could not initially learn the conspecific point, 
but were able to do so with a human when given the vocal point cue. The vocalization 
given with the point could have helped draw their attention to the task. In contrast, one 
subject, Sm, could not learn to use the human point, but was able to learn to use the 
conspecific cue within 80 trials. It is difficult to say which cue was objectively more 
obvious, because the point and the conspecific gesture were accompanied by other more 
subtle cues. The human point was accompanied by the gaze of the experimenter and 
sometimes by a vocalization, while the conspecific gestural cue was accompanied by the 
body position and gaze of the conspecific.  It is possible that the human point was easier 
to learn as four out of the six successful subjects learned the human point first.  However 
as there does not seem to be a pattern in the small sample size, I could not conclude that 
either cue was more obvious, or provided more information.  The possibility of an order 
effect should also be analyzed to determine if the order of the type of cue givers that 
monkeys were given affected their performance.  This is possible as two successful 
monkeys went from conspecific cueing to human pointing (Sc, Nw), while four went 
from human pointing to conspecific cueing (Sd, Nk, St, Ny).  Further research could also 
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investigate why individual differences occur and how such differences affect our 
understanding of how nonhuman primates understand the behavioral cues of others. 
Results showed that capuchin monkeys could learn to use gestural cues to solve 
an object-choice task even though monkeys do not use gestural communication in the 
wild.  The ability to learn how to communicate the location of food, as well as to 
understand that another is intentionally communicating the location of food could be 
highly adaptive in foraging situations. More importantly, however, the ability to read the 
unintentional gestures of others to find food would require less complex cognition, and 
have the same result. Therefore, capuchin monkeys would benefit from the ability to read 
the body language of conspecifics in order to find food, or in other situations such as 
avoiding predators.  Their apparent ability to learn these cues and then use them with 
humans shows that they are flexible, and could also have the ability to use cues from 
multiple individuals, or even from other species of monkeys.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1.  Summary of Results For Subjects in all Conditions 
Subject Group 1 C1 P1 VOC P2 C2 
Sc Conspecific-First ✓* ✓*    
Nw Conspecific-First ✓* ✓*    
Sd Conspecific-First ✓ ✓ ✓* ✓* ✓* 
Nk Conspecific-First ✓ ✓ ✓* ✓* ✓* 
Mt Conspecific-First ✓ ✓ ✓   
Subject Group 2 P1 C1 VOC P2 C2 
St Human-First ✓* ✓*    
Ny Human-First ✓* ✓*    
Sm Human-First ✓ ✓*    
Dv Human-First ✓ ✓ ✓* ✓* ✓ 
Sb Human-First ✓ ✓ ✓   
Ten brown capuchin monkeys were randomly assigned into two groups, conspecific-first 
and human-first.  Conditions are C1 (Conspecific 1), P1 (Pointing 1), VOC (Vocal), P2 
(Pointing 2), and C2 (Conspecific 2).  The order of conditions for each group varied.  A 
check mark indicates the subject participated in the phase.  An asterisk (*) indicates the 
criterion for success was reached in the condition, p<.05.  
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Figure	  1.	  Diagram	  of	  entire	  enclosure.	  Testing	  chambers	  are	  indicated	  with	  asterisks	  and	  the	  location	  of	  the	  apparatus	  (adapted	  from	  Coyne,	  2010)	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  (A)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (B)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (C)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Figure	  2.	  Testing	  apparatus	  (A),	  trial	  with	  a	  human	  experimenter	  (B),	  and	  trial	  with	  a	  conspecific	  (C).	  	  
	   38	  
	  	  	  	  	  (a)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (b)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (c)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (d)	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  3.	  Diagrams	  of	  training	  phase	  1	  (a),	  phase	  2	  (b),	  phase	  3	  (c),	  and	  phase	  4	  (d).	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Figure	  4.	  Diagram	  of	  test	  phase.	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Figure	  5.	  Percent	  correct	  for	  Sc	  over	  sessions	  of	  twenty	  trials.	  The	  dashed	  line	  indicates	  criterion	  for	  success	  (17/20	  or	  85%).	  The	  vertical	  lines	  indicate	  changes	  in	  cue	  giver	  from	  De,	  to	  Sd,	  to	  Dv,	  to	  Mt	  to	  a	  human.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  6.	  Percent	  correct	  for	  Nw	  over	  sessions	  of	  twenty	  trials.	  The	  dashed	  line	  indicates	  criterion	  for	  success	  (17/20	  or	  85%).	  The	  vertical	  lines	  indicate	  changes	  in	  cue	  giver	  from	  Sd,	  to	  Sc,	  to	  Mt	  to	  a	  human.	  	  
	   41	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  7.	  Percent	  correct	  for	  Sd	  over	  sessions	  of	  twenty	  trials.	  The	  dashed	  line	  indicates	  criterion	  for	  success	  (17/20	  or	  85%).	  The	  vertical	  lines	  indicate	  changes	  in	  cue	  giver	  from	  Sc,	  to	  Nk,	  to	  a	  human,	  to	  a	  human	  with	  a	  vocalization,	  to	  a	  human,	  to	  Sc.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  8.	  Percent	  correct	  for	  Nk	  over	  sessions	  of	  twenty	  trials.	  The	  dashed	  line	  indicates	  criterion	  for	  success	  (17/20	  or	  85%).	  The	  vertical	  lines	  indicate	  changes	  in	  cue	  giver	  from	  Nw,	  to	  Nb,	  to	  Sd,	  to	  a	  human,	  to	  a	  human	  with	  a	  vocalization,	  to	  a	  human,	  to	  Sd.	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Figure	  9.	  Percent	  correct	  for	  Mt	  over	  sessions	  of	  twenty	  trials.	  The	  dashed	  line	  indicates	  criterion	  for	  success	  (17/20	  or	  85%).	  The	  vertical	  lines	  indicate	  changes	  in	  cue	  giver	  from	  Nw,	  to	  Sd,	  to	  a	  human,	  to	  a	  human	  with	  a	  vocalization.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  10.	  Percent	  correct	  for	  St	  over	  sessions	  of	  twenty	  trials.	  The	  dashed	  line	  indicates	  criterion	  for	  success	  (17/20	  or	  85%).	  The	  vertical	  lines	  indicate	  changes	  in	  cue	  giver	  from	  a	  human,	  to	  Ny,	  to	  Sc.	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Figure	  11.	  Percent	  correct	  for	  Ny	  over	  sessions	  of	  twenty	  trials.	  The	  dashed	  line	  indicates	  criterion	  for	  success	  (17/20	  or	  85%).	  The	  vertical	  lines	  indicate	  changes	  in	  cue	  giver	  from	  a	  human,	  to	  Sc,	  to	  Sd.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  12.	  Percent	  correct	  for	  Dv	  over	  sessions	  of	  twenty	  trials.	  The	  dashed	  line	  indicates	  criterion	  for	  success	  (17/20	  or	  85%).	  The	  vertical	  lines	  indicate	  changes	  in	  cue	  giver	  from	  a	  human,	  to	  Sc,	  to	  Nw,	  to	  a	  human	  with	  a	  vocalization,	  to	  a	  human,	  to	  Sc.	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Figure	  13.	  Percent	  correct	  for	  Sm	  over	  sessions	  of	  twenty	  trials.	  The	  dashed	  line	  indicates	  criterion	  for	  success	  (17/20	  or	  85%).	  The	  vertical	  lines	  indicate	  changes	  in	  cue	  giver	  from	  a	  human,	  to	  Ny.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  14.	  Percent	  correct	  for	  Sb	  over	  sessions	  of	  twenty	  trials.	  The	  dashed	  line	  indicates	  criterion	  for	  success	  (17/20	  or	  85%).	  The	  vertical	  lines	  indicate	  changes	  in	  cue	  giver	  from	  a	  human,	  to	  a	  human	  with	  vocalization.	  	  
